Profit Sharing, Employee Ownership and Conflicts in the Firm: Evidences from French Firms
Sainte Barbe
4, rue Valette 75005 PARIS
M. Fathi FAKHFAKH - Maître de Conférences, directeur de thèse
M. Jérôme GAUTIE - Professeur des Universités, rapporteur
M. Michael VISSER - Professeur des Universités (Directeur de recherche CNRS : GRECSTA), rapporteur
M. Victor HILLER - Maître de Conférences
M. Nicholas WILSON - Professeur des Universités (Professeur à la Business School - Leeds University)
The basic idea of incentive contracts is that of achieving common interests causing changes in the behaviour of employees and improving firm performance. The firms' outputs and success also depend on the industrial relation climate. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of financial participation (profit sharing and employee share ownership) and its links with the conicts using data on French firms. Research on these topics is innovative and highly recommended. First, there exists within the firm a multitude of types of conflicts. We are primarily concerned with collective conflicts. Most of studies on collective conficts focuses only on strikes, ignoring other forms of collective actions. Very few studies make the link between collective incentive schemes and collective conflicts. Thus, this work is divided into four empirical studies. The first one analyzes the different forms of conflicts within the firm. The second one analyzes the effect of financial participation on collective conficts. The third study focuses on the impact of bargaining and financial participation on the resolution of collective conficts. The last one examines firm's performance based on financial participation and collective conficts. Our researchis based on multidimensional analysis and econometric tools. The multidimensional approach uses the Multiple Correspondence Analysis and Ascending Hierarchical Clustering. The econometric approach uses classical estimation methods (OLS, Probit, Mutinomial Probit, Ordered Pobit), selection models (Heckman), and methods estimating simultaneous and recursive equations, treating the endogeneity problems and the mixture (quantitative and qualitative) of the dependent variables (Roodman (2011) Conditional Mixed Process).
Keywords: labor economics, financial participation, prot sharing, employee share ownership, strikes, labor conflicts, conflict resolution, union, negotiation, performance, applied econometric, multidimensional analysis