Analyse économique de la norme juridique : des origines constitutionnelles à la mise en oeuvre par le juge

The legitimacy and the stability of political systems have very often been studied in economics separate from considerations about legal norms' enforcement. My objective is to combine these different approaches, and to place the question of the legal enforcement at the heart of the debate about institutions. This work is made of cinq empirical and experimental investigations that deal with each of the stages of the political and legal process. This first paper analyzes the impact of constitutional rights on public expenditures. The second article explores the influence of self-serving biases on the demand and the supply of redistribution. The third analysis focuses on the decisions of the French Constitutional Council. The fourth work deals with the recent reform of the judiciary map of French labor courts. The last study investigates the relationship between the composition of the elected jurors in French labor courts and the way cases are terminated. Our investigations rely on econometric and experimental techniques. They use standard estimation methods (OLS, GLS, Probit, Logit, Within OLS), selection models (Heckman, Triprotibt), techniques for endogeneity correction (2SLS), and methods to estimate systems of equations (3SLS). The experimental analysis makes use of standard statistical tests (permutation tests, proportion tests, two-group mean-comparison tests), and more recent methods to solve heterogeneity (wild clustering). Keywords: Law and Economics, Political Economy, Constitutional